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PRACTITIONERS' NOTES
THE NLRB'S DEFERRAL POLICY UNDER FIRE:
THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S CRITICISM AND THE
FUTURE OF THE DEFERRAL POLICY
Celeste J. Mattina*

In recent years, the National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB" or
"Board") deferral policy has been called into question by the D.C.
Circuit. This article will provide an overview of the Board's deferral
policy, discuss the D.C. Circuit's criticism of the policy, examine the
potential conflict between the D.C. Circuit's approach and Supreme
Court precedent, and finally, describe what steps the General Counsel's
office has taken to address these issues.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE BOARD's DEFERRAL POLICY

The Board follows two policies on deferral-one at the pre-arbitral
phase and one at the post-arbitral phase. At the pre-arbitral phase, the
Board will withhold making a final determination on certain, arguably
meritorious, unfair labor practice ("ULP") charges when a grievance
involving the same issue can be processed under the grievanceThis policy is
arbitration provisions of the applicable contract.'
consistent with the National Labor Relations Act's ("NLRA" or "Act")
goal of promoting the resolution of disputes under the parties' collective
bargaining agreements. At the post-arbitral phase, the Board will decide
whether it should defer to an arbitration award or grievance-settlement.

* Acting Deputy General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board. I would like to
thank Field Attorney Rebecca Leaf for her assistance on this article.
1. The Board's deferral policy is set forth in Collyer InsulatedWire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 83943 (1971), and United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 557-61 (1984).
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The pre-arbitral deferral policy is set forth in Collyer Insulated Wire.2
The post-arbitral policy is set forth in Spielberg Manufacturing Co. 3 and
clarified in Olin Corp.4 This article will focus on the post-arbitral
deferral standard under Spielberg and Olin.
Under Spielberg/Olin, the Board will defer to an arbitral award or
settlement if four factors are met:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The arbitration proceedings were fair and regular;
The parties agreed to be bound;
The arbitrator's decision is not clearly repugnant to the Act; and
The arbitrator considered the ULP issue.

The D.C. Circuit Court has challenged the Board's deferral policy,
particularly criticizing Factor 3 of the Spielberg/Olin framework. The
court's criticism of the Board's deferral policy is discussed in the
following part.

II. D.C. CIRCUIT CRITICISM OF THE BOARD'S DEFERRAL POLICY
AND THE IMPLIED WAIVER DOCTRINE

In two recent cases, the D.C. Circuit considered, and called into
question, the Board's deferral policy under Spielberg/Olin.6 In a
harshly-worded opinion, the D.C. Circuit stated that the Board had an
"apparent lack of a coherent theory for its . . . deference policy."7 It
urged "the Board to give serious consideration to the logical flaws in its
current policy and to attempt to develop a comprehensible theory of
deference." The D.C. Circuit said its "patience with the Board's failure
2. See 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 839-43. The Collyer standard, which focuses on pre-arbitral
deferral, is beyond the scope of this article.
3. See 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082, 1090 (1955).
4. See 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 573-74 (1984).
5. Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082 (setting the first three factors); Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at
573-574 (reaffirming the first three factors and adding the fourth).
6. See Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d 744, 755-57 (D.C.
Cir. 1992); Titanium Metals Corp. v. NLRB, 392 F.3d 439, 446-47 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In its
decisions, the court discussed both Spielberg/Olin and post-arbitral awards, as well as pre-arbitral
grievance settlements under Alpha Beta Co. See Plumbers & Pipefitters, 955 F.2d at 749-50, 755-57
(citing Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1546, 1547-48 (1985)); Titanium Metals, 392 F.3d at 444-47
(citing Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. at 1546-47). In Alpha Beta Co., the Board expanded the
Spielberg/Olindeferral policy beyond post-arbitral awards to pre-arbitral grievance settlements. See
273 N.L.R.B. 1546, 1547 (1985).
7. Plumbers & PipeJitters,955 F.2d at 755.
8. Id. at 757.
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to develop a coherent theory of deference is not limitless, and the
Board's continued recalcitrance may well result in reversal in future
cases." 9 These strong words from the D.C. Circuit are significant,
because any party may seek review of a Board decision in the D.C.
Circuit.10
The Court's criticism is directed squarely at Factor 3 of the
Spielberg/Olin framework. Factor 3 requires that the arbitrator's
decision or the grievance settlement award not be "clearly repugnant" to
the Act." The Board clarified the meaning of "not clearly repugnant" in
Olin, explaining that the arbitrator's award must not be "palpably
wrong."l 2 In the grievance settlement context, the Board deems this
factor met if both parties to the settlement make concessions.13
In Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 520,14 the D.C. Circuit
found the so-called "concessions test" redundant, because any time two
parties enter into a settlement, it logically follows that one or both
parties make concessions, thereby satisfying the concessions test.15
Thus, the D.C. Circuit argued that Factor 3 is entirely unnecessary.
In addition to criticizing Factor 3 for its redundancy, the D.C.
Circuit said this factor was a "veritable recipe for arbitrary action."1 6
Specifically, the court stated that the "palpably wrong" criterion lacks
standard application and predictability, and allows the Board to defer
when it likes the result of an award or settlement, and intervene when it
does not.17 Despite its criticism of the Board's deferral policy, the D.C.
Circuit, nevertheless, upheld the Board's decision to defer to the
settlement in Plumbers & Pipefitters." The reason it upheld the
decision was because the court found that deferral could have been
justified under the implied waiver doctrine. 9
Under the implied waiver doctrine, if the Union can waive the
statutory right in question and it validly waives such right in the contract
or in the course of settling a grievance, deferral is not only appropriate,

9. Id.
10. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2006).
11. Plumbers & Pipefitters, 955 F.2d at 756-57.
12. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574 (1984).
13. See Plumbers & Pipefitters, 955 F.2d at 756; Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. at 1547-48;
U.S. Postal Service, 300 N.L.R.B. 196, 197-98 (1990).
14. 955 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
15. See id. at 756-57.
16. Id. at 757.
17. See id. at 756-57.
18. See id. at 746.
19. See id. at 756-57.
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but also required.20 In such cases, the D.C. Circuit would make deferral
mandatory unless the proceedings were not fair or regular, or the Union
breached its duty of fair representation in its handling of the grievance.21
In the D.C. Circuit Court's view, when a Union waives an employee's
statutory right in favor of a contractual right, the statutory issue merges
with the contractual issue and there is no statutory issue left for the
Board to decide.22
According to the D.C. Circuit, mandatory deferral under the
implied waiver doctrine would avoid leaving deferral up to the "whim of
the Board." 2 3 However, the implied waiver doctrine appears to conflict
with the 2009 Supreme Court decision in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett.24 The
conflict between the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court decisions is
discussed in the following part.
III. SUPREME COURT-REJECTION OF THE IMPLIED
WAIVER DOCTRINE

Like the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court recently addressed the
issue of whether unions can waive their member employees' statutory
rights. However, instead of adopting the D.C. Circuit's implied waiver
doctrine, the Supreme Court reiterated the need for a "clear and
unmistakable" waiver of rights.2 5
In Pyett, the Supreme Court held that in order to waive a statutory
right, the union must "clearly and unmistakably" waive such right in the
contract. 26 In that case, the contract prohibited discrimination based on
age, among other reasons, provided that all such claims be arbitrated "as
the sole and exclusive remedy for violations," and required that the

20. See id. at 756. A union can waive certain rights of its unit members, but is prohibited from
waiving other rights. For example, the Board has deemed the right to strike a "waivable" right,
while preserving the right to choose a bargaining representative as "non-waivable." See id; see also
Energy Coop., Inc. v. Sako, 290 NLRB 635, 636 (1988). Although the courts do not explicitly refer
to the implied waiver doctrine, it is implicit in their view that the union representative can waive the
members rights through an ambiguous contract clause or through the course of dealings.
21. Plumbers & Pipefitters,955 F.2d at 756.

22. See id.
23. See Titanium Metals Corp. v. NLRB, 392 F.3d 439, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
24. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
25. See id. at 1463 (citing Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998)). In
Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., the Supreme Court adopted the "clear and unmistakable"
standard as applied "to a union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory right[s]." See 525 U.S.
70, 80 (1998).
26. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1474.
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arbitrator apply statutory law in resolving those claims.27 There, the
Supreme Court explained that because the contract clearly and
unmistakably required union members to arbitrate age discrimination
claims, the Union waived that statutory right in the contract, thereby
precluding the members from pursuing their statutory age discrimination
claim in court.28
The Court distinguished Pyett from Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.,29 where the Court came to the opposite conclusion years earlier.
There, the Court did not find a waiver of the union members' statutory
right to litigate discrimination claims in court, despite a prior adverse
arbitration award. 30 Gardner-Denverwas found to be distinguishable
because the underlying contract did not clearly and unmistakably waive
employee statutory rights." Rather, the contract in Gardner-Denver
contained a no-discrimination clause, required that discharges be for just
cause, and provided for final and binding arbitration of differences "as to
the meaning and application" of contract provisions and "any trouble
arising in the plant."
The "clear and unmistakable" standard reiterated in Pyett appears to
be directly at odds with the D.C. Circuit's implied waiver doctrine. The
D.C. Circuit would hold that so long as a union includes language about
a statutory right in the contract and requires arbitration of contract
disputes, the statutory right is automatically waived. 33 However, under
the Supreme Court's decision in Pyett, a waiver of statutory rights is not
so easily established. Rather, the Supreme Court would require the
contract to clearly and unmistakably waive an employee's right to
litigate that particular statutory right before it would find a waiver.
IV. THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S REACTION TO THESE COURT DECISIONS

Under Memorandum OM 10-13, regions were instructed to submit
to Advice any cases where deferral was not appropriate.34 The Division

27. See id. at 1461.
28. See id. at 1464.
29. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
30. See id at 49.
31. See Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1468-69.
32. See Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 39-40.
33. See, e.g., Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d 744, 756 (D.C.
Cir. 1992). The D.C. Circuit's holding is limited to the category of rights that can properly be
waived by a Union.
34. Memorandum from Richard A. Siegel, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB Div. of Operations
Mgmt., on Casehandling Regarding Application of Spielberg/Olin Standards to All Reg'l Dirs.,
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of Advice is the office through which the General Counsel decides
significant legal and policy issues in ULP cases. This memorandum was
issued in response to the D.C. Circuit cases and the Supreme Court's
Pyett decision, discussed in part II and III above. Because the General
Counsel and the Board have not had a chance to consider, and possibly
refine, the Board's approach to deferral in light of the D.C. Circuit's
criticism and the Pyett decision, the Office of the General Counsel has
more recently directed regions to submit only meritorious cases to
Advice for guidance on the appropriate arguments to make on the
31
deferral question.
If the case is not meritorious, regions were
instructed to dismiss those cases on the merits, instead of determining
whether any award or settlement reached under the grievance procedure
is subject to deferral under our current standards.
This last instruction may not significantly alter the determination
made in these cases. Even in cases where deferral is not deemed
appropriate, regions will consider the evidence submitted to an arbitrator
and will independently assess whether that evidence supports dismissal
of the charge. If, for example, the evidence submitted is sufficient to
establish that the employer's action was based on legitimate business
considerations, the region will dismiss the charge. Moreover, the region
will also dismiss a charge if the evidence presented provides an
objective basis for an administrative resolution of credibility issues. For
example, a charge will be dismissed where the grievant's version of the
facts is contradicted by neutral witnesses or documentary evidence. In
some cases, it may, nevertheless, be necessary to conduct a
supplementary investigation before making a determination on the
merits.
General Counsel, Ron Meisburg, addressed the question of deferral
and implied waiver in a recent case submitted to Advice.
Notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit's criticism of Factor 3, the General
Counsel concluded that deferral to the settlement agreement negotiated
in this case was not appropriate because it was "repugnant" to the Act.
In that case, the employer had suspended a number of employees who
refused to wear t-shirts displaying the union logo. 36 Refusing to wear

Officers-In-Charge, and Residential Officers, NLRB 2 (Nov. 3, 2009) available at
http://www.ilr.comell.edullawlevents/upload/OM-10-13-CH-Casehandling-Regarding-Applicationto-Spielberg-Olin-standards.pdf.

35. See id.
36. Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Div. of
Advice, NLRB, to Ronald K. Hooks, Reg'l Dir., Region 26, NLRB 1-2 (Mar. 29, 2010) (on file
with author).
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union insignia is an activity protected under section 7 of the Act.37 The
union and employer settled the grievances without providing any
remedy, such as back pay, for the time the employees were suspended."
The General Counsel refused to defer to the settlement, labeling it
repugnant, because by providing no remedy for employees, the
settlement penalized the employees for engaging in activities protected
by the Act.3 9 The General Counsel referred to the D.C. Circuit's implied
waiver doctrine in its decision, but concluded that its application was
erroneous in light of Pyett and that any waiver of statutory rights must
be "clear and unmistakable."4 0
General Counsel Meisberg also addressed the genesis of the
Board's deferral policy in light of section 10(a) of the Act. Section 10(a)
empowers the Board to adjudicate unfair labor practice issues without
regard to "any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or
may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise." 4 1 Simply put,
section 10(a) gives the Board full discretion to determine the extent to
which it wishes to defer.42 Once it decides to defer, the Board applies
the Spielberg/Olin standards to ensure that the settlement or award does
not undermine the basic values of the Act.43 It is anticipated that the
Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon will be issuing guideline
memoranda addressing these issues in the near future.

37. Id. at3.
38. Id.
39. Id. at1.
40. See id. at 10. In addition to finding that the union did not clearly and unmistakable waive
statutory rights in the contract, the General Counsel also found that the right to refuse to wear union
insignia is a non-waivable right altogether. See id. at 9-10. Specifically, based on NLRB v.
Magnavox and its progeny, a members' free expression of support of, or opposition to, a union is a
non-waivable right. See id. (citing NLRB v. Magnavox, 415 U.S. 322, 326 (1974)). Thus, the
General Counsel argued that the union would not be able to waive its members' right to refuse to
wear union insignia at all. See id. at 10. Therefore, even under the D.C. Circuit's implied waiver
doctrine, deferral would be inappropriate. See id. at 9-10.
41. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2006).
42. Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, supra note 36, at 6 (on file with author) (noting that
deferral is not an abdication of power, but rather, an exercise of its power under section 10(a)).
43. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
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